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Plaintiff Epic Games, Inc. (“Epic”), by its undersigned counsel, alleges, 
with knowledge with respect to its own acts and on information and belief as to other 
matters, as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
1. In 1998, Google was founded as an exciting young company with a 
unique motto: “Don’t Be Evil”.  Google’s Code of Conduct explained that this 
admonishment was about “how we serve our users” and “much more than that . . . it’s 
also about doing the right thing more generally”.1  Twenty-two years later, Google has 
relegated its motto to nearly an afterthought, and is using its size to do evil upon 
competitors, innovators, customers, and users in a slew of markets it has grown to 
monopolize.  This case is about doing the right thing in one important area, the Android 
mobile ecosystem, where Google unlawfully maintains monopolies in multiple related 
markets, denying consumers the freedom to enjoy their mobile devices—freedom that 
Google always promised Android users would have. 
2. Google acquired the Android mobile operating system more than a 
decade ago, promising repeatedly over time that Android would be the basis for an 
“open” ecosystem in which industry participants could freely innovate and compete 
without unnecessary restrictions.2  Google’s CEO, Sundar Pichai, represented in 2014 
 
1 Kate Conger, Google Removes ‘Don’t Be Evil’ Clause from Its Code of Conduct, Gizmodo 
(May 18, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/google-removes-nearly-all-mentions-of-dont-be-evil-from-
1826153393. 
2 Google Blog, News and notes from Android team, The Benefits & Importance of Compatibility,  
(Sept. 14, 2012), https://android.googleblog.com/2012/09/the-benefits-importance-of-
compatibility.html (“We built Android to be an open source mobile platform freely available to anyone 
wishing to use it . . .  . This openness allows device manufacturers to customize Android and enable 
new user experiences, driving innovation and consumer choice.”); Stuart Dredge, Google’s Sundar 
Pichai on wearable tech: ‘We’re just scratching the surface’, The Guardian (Mar. 9, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/09/google-sundar-pichai-android-chrome-sxsw 
(“Android is one of the most open systems that I’ve ever seen”); Andy Rubin, Andy Rubin’s Email to 
Android Partners, The Wall Street Journal (Mar. 13, 2013), available at 
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/03/13/andy-rubins-email-to-android-partners/?mod=WSJBlog (“At 
its core, Android has always been about openness”).  
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that Android “is one of the most open systems that I’ve ever seen”.3  And Andy Rubin, 
an Android founder who is described by some as the “Father of Android”, said when he 
departed Google in 2013 that “at its core, Android has always been about openness”.4 
Since then, Google has deliberately and systematically closed the Android ecosystem to 
competition, breaking the promises it made.  Google’s anti-competitive conduct has 
now been condemned by regulators the world over.   
3. Epic brings claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and 
under California law to end Google’s unlawful monopolization and anti-competitive 
restraints in two separate markets:  (1) the market for the distribution of mobile apps to 
Android users and (2) the market for processing payments for digital content within 
Android mobile apps.  Epic seeks to end Google’s unfair, monopolistic and anti-
competitive actions in each of these markets, which harm device makers, app 
developers, app distributors, payment processors, and consumers.   
4. Epic does not seek monetary compensation from this Court for 
the injuries it has suffered.  Epic likewise does not seek a side deal or favorable 
treatment from Google for itself.  Instead, Epic seeks injunctive relief that would deliver 
Google’s broken promise:  an open, competitive Android ecosystem for all users and 
industry participants.  Such injunctive relief is sorely needed. 
5. Google has eliminated competition in the distribution of Android 
apps using myriad contractual and technical barriers.  Google’s actions force app 
developers and consumers into Google’s own monopolized “app store”—the Google 
Play Store.  Google has thus installed itself as an unavoidable middleman for app 
developers who wish to reach Android users and vice versa.  Google uses this monopoly 
power to impose a tax that siphons monopoly profits for itself every time an app 
 
3 Stuart Dredge, Google’s Sundar Pichai on wearable tech: ‘We’re just scratching the surface’, The 
Guardian (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/09/google-sundar-
pichai-android-chrome-sxsw.  
4 Andy Rubin, Andy Rubin’s Email to Android Partners, The Wall Street Journal (Mar. 13, 2013), 
available at https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/03/13/andy-rubins-email-to-android-
partners/?mod=WSJBlog. 
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developer transacts with a consumer for the sale of an app or in-app digital content.  
And Google further siphons off all user data exchanged in such transactions, to benefit 
its own app designs and advertising business.   
6. If not for Google’s anti-competitive behavior, the Android 
ecosystem could live up to Google’s promise of open competition, providing Android 
users and developers with competing app stores that offer more innovation, significantly 
lower prices and a choice of payment processors.  Such an open system is not hard to 
imagine.  Two decades ago, through the actions of courts and regulators, Microsoft was 
forced to open up the Windows for PC ecosystem.  As a result, PC users have multiple 
options for downloading software unto their computers, either directly from developers’ 
websites or from several competing stores.  No single entity controls the ecosystem or 
imposes a tax on all transactions.  And Google, as the developer of software such as the 
Chrome browser, is a direct beneficiary of this competitive landscape.  Android users 
and developers likewise deserve free and fair competition.   
* * * 
7. In today’s world, virtually all consumers and businesses stay 
connected, informed, and entertained through smart mobile computing devices such as 
smartphones and tablets.  Mobile applications (“apps”) are innovative software products 
that greatly contribute to those devices’ value.  Consumers the world over use smart 
mobile devices and mobile apps to video chat with friends, pay bills, stay current with 
the news, listen to music, watch videos, play games, and more. 
8. Epic develops and distributes entertainment apps for personal 
computers, gaming consoles, and smart mobile devices.  The most popular game Epic 
currently makes is Fortnite, which has connected hundreds of millions of people in a 
colorful virtual world where they meet, play, talk, compete, dance, and even attend 
concerts and other cultural events.  
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9. Fortnite is free for everyone to download and play.  To generate 
revenue, Epic offers users various in-app purchases of content for use within the app, 
such as digital avatars, costumes, dances, or other cosmetic enhancements.   
 
 
10. In the first year after Fortnite was released in 2017, the game 
attracted over 125 million players; in the years since, Fortnite has topped 350 million 
players and has become a global cultural phenomenon.  
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11. Similar to a PC or a Mac personal computer, smart mobile devices 
use an “operating system” or “OS” to provide core device functionality and to enable 
the operation of compatible programs.  As with PCs, the commercial viability of an OS 
for mobile devices (a “mobile OS”) depends on the availability of a large number of 
compatible apps that cater to the preferences and needs of users.   
12. Google controls the most ubiquitous OS used in mobile devices, the 
Android OS.  Android OS is used by billions of users the world over, and boasts nearly 
3 million compatible apps.   
13. Android is the only commercially viable OS that is widely available 
to license by companies that design and sell smart mobile devices, known as original 
equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”).  Accordingly, when OEMs select a mobile OS to 
install on their devices, they have only one option:  Google’s Android OS.  Google 
therefore has monopoly power in the market for mobile operating systems that are 
available for license by OEMs (the Merchant Market for Mobile Operating Systems 
(infra Part I)).  
14. Google has not been satisfied with its control of the Android OS.  
Notwithstanding its promises to make Android devices open to competition, Google has 
erected contractual and technological barriers that foreclose competing ways of 
distributing apps to Android users, ensuring that the Google Play Store accounts for 
nearly all the downloads of apps from app stores on Android devices.  Google thus 
maintains a monopoly over the market for distributing mobile apps to Android users, 
referred to herein as the “Android App Distribution Market” (infra Part II).     
15. For example, Google bundles the Google Play Store with a set of 
other Google services that Android OEMs must have on their devices (such as Gmail, 
Google Search, Google Maps, and YouTube) and conditions the licensing of those 
services on an OEM’s agreement to pre-install the Google Play Store and to 
prominently display it.  Google then interferes with OEMs’ ability to make third-party 
app stores or apps available on the devices they make.  These restrictions effectively 
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foreclose competing app stores—and even single apps—from what could be a primary 
distribution channel.   
16. Epic’s experience with one OEM, OnePlus, is illustrative.  Epic 
struck a deal with OnePlus to make Epic games available on its phones through an Epic 
Games app.  The Epic Games app would have allowed users to seamlessly install and 
update Epic games, including Fortnite, without obstacles imposed by Google’s Android 
OS.  But Google forced OnePlus to renege on the deal, citing Google’s “particular[] 
concern” about Epic having the ability to install and update mobile games while 
“bypassing the Google Play Store”.   
17. Another OEM, LG, told Epic that its contract with Google did not 
allow it to enable the direct distribution of apps, and that the OEM could not offer any 
functionality that would install and update Epic games except through the Google Play 
Store.   
18. Google also enforces anti-competitive restrictions against app 
developers.  Specifically, Google contractually prohibits app developers from offering 
on the Google Play Store any app that could be used to download other apps, i.e., any 
app that could compete with the Google Play Store in app distribution.  And Google 
further requires app developers to distribute their apps through the Google Play Store if 
they wish to advertise their apps through valuable advertising channels controlled by 
Google, such as ad placements on Google Search or on YouTube that are specially 
optimized to advertise mobile apps. 
19. Finally, Google stifles or blocks consumers’ ability to download app 
stores and apps directly from developers’ websites.  As anyone who has tried to 
download directly on an Android device knows, it is significantly different than the 
simple process available on a personal computer:  directly downloading Fortnite on an 
Android device can involve a dozen steps, requiring the user to change default settings 
and bravely click through multiple dire warnings.  And even if a persistent user manages 
to install a competing app store, Google prevents such stores from competing on equal 
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footing with the Google Play Store by blocking them from offering basic functions, 
such as automatic updating of apps in the background, which is available for apps 
downloaded from the Google Play Store.  
20. Google engages in these anticompetitive acts to eliminate consumer 
choice and competition in mobile app distribution.  Google has no legitimate 
justification for these restrictions.  Google therefore has broken its promises that 
Android would be an “open” ecosystem in which other participants could participate 
fairly.   
21. But Google does not stop at app distribution.  Google also imposes 
anti-competitive restrictions in the separate Market for Android In-app Payment 
Processing (infra Part III).   
22. App developers who sell digital content for consumption within the 
app itself require seamless payment processing tools to execute purchases.  App 
developers, including Epic, may develop such payment processing tools internally or 
use a host of payment processing tools offered by multiple competing third parties.   
23. Google, however, ties distribution through its Google Play Store 
with  developers’ exclusive use of Google’s own payment processing tool, called 
Google Play Billing, to process in-app purchases of digital content.  Indeed, app 
developers that distribute through the Google Play Store are even prohibited from 
offering Android users the choice of additional payment processing options alongside 
Google’s for digital content.  And because Google has a monopoly in the Android App 
Distribution Market, app developers cannot practically avoid this anti-competitive tie by 
electing app distribution through an alternative channel.   
24. The result is that in every in-app transaction for digital content, it is 
Google, not the app developer, that collects the payment in the first instance.  Google 
then taxes the transaction at an exorbitant 30% rate, remitting the remaining 70% to the 
developer who actually made the sale.  This 30% commission is often ten times higher 
than the price typically paid for the use of other electronic payment solutions.   
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25. Moreover, through this tie, Google inserts itself as an intermediary 
between each seller and each buyer for every purchase of digital content within the 
Android ecosystem, collecting for itself the personal information of users, which Google 
then uses to give an anti-competitive edge to its own advertising services and mobile 
app development business.   
26. But for Google’s monopolistic conduct, competing stores could offer 
consumers and developers choice in distribution and payment processing.  Indeed, Epic, 
which distributes gaming apps through its own store to users of personal computers, 
would open a store to compete with Google’s and offer developers more innovation and 
more choice, including in payment processing.  App developers would not have to pay 
Google’s supra-competitive tax of 30%, as the price of distribution and payment 
processing alike would be set by market forces rather than by Google’s fiat.  Developers 
could address any payment-related issues (such as refunds) directly with their own 
customers rather than through Google.  And users and developers, jointly, would get to 
decide whether users’ data should be utilized for other purposes.   
27. Google’s anti-competitive conduct has injured Epic, both as an app 
developer and as a potential competitor in app distribution and payment processing.  
Epic has repeatedly approached Google and asked to negotiate relief that would stop 
Google’s unlawful and anti-competitive restrictions on app developers and consumers.  
But Google would not budge. 
28. Because of Google’s refusal to stop its ongoing anti-competitive and 
unlawful conduct, on August 13, 2020, Epic began providing Fortnite players the choice 
of using Epic’s own direct payment tool as an alternative to Google’s overpriced Billing 
tool, sharing with players who chose to use Epic’s payment tool the resulting savings.   
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29. In retribution, Google removed Fortnite from Google Play Store 
listings, preventing new players from obtaining the game.  Google also prevented 
Android users who acquired Fortnite from the Google Play Store from obtaining app 
updates they will need to continue playing with their friends and family.   
30. Epic has publicly advocated for years that Google cease the anti-
competitive conduct addressed in this Complaint.  Google refused to change its 
industry-impacting conduct.  Instead, Google offered to placate Epic by offering it 
preferential terms on side deals, such as YouTube sponsorships and cloud services, if 
Epic agreed to distribute Fortnite in the Google Play Store and acceded to Google’s 
30% tax.  Google has reached at least one preferential deal with another mobile game 
developer, Activision Blizzard, and Epic believes that Google is using similar deals with 
other companies to allow Google to keep its monopolistic behavior publicly 
unchallenged.  But Epic is not interested in any side deals that might benefit Epic alone 
while leaving Google’s anti-competitive restraints intact; instead, Epic is focused on 
opening up the Android ecosystem for the benefit of all developers and consumers.   
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31. Accordingly, Epic seeks injunctive relief in court.  Google’s conduct 
has caused and continues to cause Epic financial harm, but Epic is not bringing this case 
to recover these damages; Epic is not seeking any monetary relief, but rather only an 
order enjoining Google from continuing to impose its anti-competitive conduct on the 
Android ecosystem.   
PARTIES 
32. Plaintiff Epic Games, Inc. is a Maryland corporation with its 
principal place of business in Cary, North Carolina.  Epic’s mission is “to create fun 
games we want to play and to build the art and tools needed to bring those games to 
life”.  Epic was founded in 1991 by a college student named Tim Sweeney.  Mr. 
Sweeney ran Epic out of his parents’ basement and distributed, by mail, Epic’s first 
commercial personal computer software, a game named ZZT.  Since then, Epic has 
developed several popular entertainment software products that can be played on an 
array of platforms—such as personal computers, gaming consoles, and smart mobile 
devices.  Epic also creates and distributes the Unreal Engine, a powerful software suite 
that allows competing game developers and others to create realistic three-dimensional 
content, including video games, architectural recreations, television shows, and movies.  
An Epic subsidiary also develops and distributes the popular Houseparty app, which 
enables video chatting and social gaming on smart mobile devices and personal 
computers.  Worldwide, approximately 400 million users have signed up to play Epic 
games, and each day 30 to 40 million individuals log into an Epic game.  
33. Defendant Google LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with 
its principal place of business in Mountain View, California.  Google LLC is the 
primary operating subsidiary of the publicly traded holding company Alphabet Inc.  The 
sole member of Google LLC is XXVI Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Mountain View, California.  Google LLC contracts with 
all app developers that distribute their apps through the Google Play Store and is 
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therefore a party to the anti-competitive contractual restrictions at issue in this 
Complaint. 
34. Defendant Google Ireland Limited (“Google Ireland”) is a limited 
company organized under the laws of Ireland with its principal place of business in 
Dublin, Ireland, and a subsidiary of Google LLC.  Google Ireland contracts with all app 
developers that distribute their apps through the Google Play Store and is therefore a 
party to the anti-competitive contractual restrictions at issue in this Complaint. 
35. Defendant Google Commerce Limited (“Google Commerce”) is a 
limited company organized under the laws of Ireland with its principal place of business 
in Dublin, Ireland, and a subsidiary of Google LLC.  Google Commerce contracts with 
all app developers that distribute their apps through the Google Play Store and is 
therefore a party to the anti-competitive contractual restrictions at issue in this 
Complaint. 
36. Defendant Google Asia Pacific Pte. Limited (“Google Asia Pacific”) 
is a private limited company organized under the laws of Singapore with its principal 
place of business in Mapletree Business City, Singapore, and a subsidiary of Google 
LLC.  Google Asia Pacific contracts with all app developers that distribute their apps 
through the Google Play Store and is therefore a party to the anti-competitive 
contractual restrictions at issue in this Complaint.   
37. Defendant Google Payment Corp. (“Google Payment”) is a 
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California, 
and a subsidiary of Google LLC.  Google Payment provides in-app payment processing 
services to Android app developers and Android users and collects a 30% commission 
on many types of processed payments, including payments for apps sold through the 
Google Play Store and in-app purchases made within such apps. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
38. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Epic’s federal 
antitrust claims pursuant to the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, and 28 U.S.C. 
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§§ 1331 and 1337.  The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Epic’s state law claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  The Court also has subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on the diversity of citizenships of 
Plaintiff, on the one hand, and of Defendants, on the other, and the amount in 
controversy exceeding $75,000.   
39. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.  Google 
LLC and Google Payment are headquartered in this District.  All Defendants have 
engaged in sufficient minimum contacts with the United States and have purposefully 
availed themselves of the benefits and protections of United States and California law, 
such that the exercise of jurisdiction over them would comport with due process 
requirements.  Further, the Defendants have consented to the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by this Court.   
40. Each of the Defendants except Google Payment is party to a Google 
Play Developer Distribution Agreement (the “DDA”) with Epic.  Section 16.8 of the 
DDA provides that the parties “agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal or state courts located within the county of Santa Clara, California, to resolve 
any legal matter arising from or relating to this Agreement”.  Section 16.8 further 
provides that “[a]ll claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement or Your 
relationship with Google under this Agreement will be governed by the laws of the State 
of California, excluding California’s conflict of laws provisions.”  The claims addressed 
in this Complaint relate to the DDA or to Epic’s relationship with Google under the 
DDA, or in the alternative such claims arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts 
as other claims as to which the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over each 
Defendant, so that the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction would be proper.    
41. Google Payment is party to a Google Payments—Terms of 
Service—Seller Agreement with Epic.  Section 11.3 of that Agreement provides that 
“[t]he exclusive venue for any dispute related to this Agreement will be the state or 
federal courts located in Santa Clara County, California, and each party consents to 
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personal jurisdiction in these courts.”  Section 11.3 further provides that “The laws of 
California, excluding California’s choice of law rules, and applicable federal United 
States laws will govern this Agreement.”  The dispute between Google Payment and 
Epic relates to the parties’ Agreement, or in the alternative Epic’s claims arise out of the 
same nucleus of operative facts as other claims as to which the Court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over Google Payment, so that the exercise of pendent personal 
jurisdiction would be proper. 
42. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) 
because Google LLC and Google Payment maintain their principal places of business in 
the State of California and in this District, because a substantial part of the events or 
omissions giving rise to Epic’s claims occurred in this District, and because, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), any Defendants not resident in the United States may be sued in 
any judicial district and their joinder with others shall be disregarded in determining 
proper venue.  In the alternative, personal jurisdiction and venue also may be deemed 
proper under Section 12 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, because 
Defendants may be found in or transact business in this District.  
INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT 
43. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-2(c), this antitrust case shall not be 
assigned to a particular Division of this District, but shall be assigned on a District-wide 
basis.  
RELEVANT FACTS 
I. Google Dominates the Merchant Market for Mobile Operating Systems. 
44. To understand how Google effectively monopolizes the Android 
App Distribution and Android In-App Payment Processing Markets, as described below 
in Parts II and III, it is helpful to understand the background of smart mobile devices 
and how Google effectively dominates the related Merchant Market for Mobile 
Operating Systems through its control over the Android operating system.   
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A. The Merchant Market for Mobile Operating Systems 
 Product Market Definition  
45. Smart mobile devices are handheld, portable electronic devices that 
can connect wirelessly to the internet and are capable of multi-purpose computing 
functions, including, among other things, Internet browsing, using social media, 
streaming video, listening to music, or playing games.  Smart mobile devices include 
smartphones and tablet computers.  Many consumers may only have a smart mobile 
device and no other computer.  Such consumers are particularly hard-hit by Google’s 
unlawful conduct in mobile-related markets.   
46. Like laptop and desktop personal computers, mobile devices require 
an operating system or “OS” that enables multi-purpose computing functionality.  A 
mobile OS, just like the OS of any computer, is a piece of software that provides basic 
functionality to users of mobile devices such as button controls, touch commands, 
motion commands, and the basic “graphical user interface”, which includes “icons” and 
other visual elements representing actions that the user can take.  A mobile OS also 
manages the basic operations of a smart mobile device, such as cellular or WiFi 
connectivity, GPS positioning, camera and video recording, speech recognition, and 
other features.  In addition, a mobile OS permits the installation and operation of mobile 
apps that are compatible with the particular OS and facilitates their use of the device’s 
OS-managed core functionality. 
47. To ensure that every user can access the basic functions of a mobile 
device “out of the box”, that is at the time he/she purchases the device, an OEM must 
pre-install an OS on each device prior to its sale.  This is similar to a personal computer 
that comes pre-installed with Microsoft Windows for PC or Apple’s macOS for a Mac 
computer.  OEMs design mobile devices to ensure the device’s compatibility with a 
particular OS the OEM chooses for a particular model of mobile device, so that the 
device may utilize the capabilities of that OS.  For OEMs, the process of implementing 
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a mobile OS requires significant time and investment, making switching to another 
mobile OS difficult, expensive, and time-consuming.   
48. The vast majority of OEMs do not develop their own OS and must 
choose an OS that can be licensed for installation on smart mobile devices they design.  
There is therefore a relevant Merchant Market for Mobile OSs comprising mobile OSs 
that OEMs can license for installation on the smart mobile devices they manufacture.  
The market does not include proprietary OSs that are not available for licensing, such as 
Apple’s mobile OS, called iOS.  Historically, the Merchant Market for Mobile OSs has 
included the Android OS, developed by Google; the Tizen mobile OS, a partially open-
source mobile OS that is developed by the Linux Foundation and Samsung; and the 
Windows Phone OS developed by Microsoft. 
49. Some consumers continue to use cellular phones that do not have 
multi-purpose, computing functions.  These simple phones resemble older “flip 
phones”, for example; they are not part of the smart mobile device category.  These 
phones do not support mobile apps such as Fortnite and are instead typically limited to 
basic cellular functionality like voice calls and texting.  The simple operating systems 
on these phones, to the extent they exist, cannot support the wide array of features 
supplied by the OSs on smart mobile devices and are not part of the Merchant Market 
for Mobile OSs defined herein. 
50. To the extent that electronic devices other than smart mobile devices 
use operating systems, those OSs are not compatible with mobile devices, and therefore 
are not included in the Merchant Market for Mobile OSs defined herein.  For example, 
computing devices that are not handheld and portable, that are not capable of multi-
purpose computing functions and/or that lack cellular connectivity—such as desktop 
computers, laptops, or gaming consoles—are not considered to be “smart mobile 
devices”.  Gaming devices like Sony’s PlayStation 4 (“PS4”) and Microsoft’s Xbox are 
physically difficult to transport, require a stable WiFi or wired connection to operate 
smoothly, and require an external screen for the user to engage in game play.  Thus, 
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even if a gamer owns, for example, a dedicated, non-portable gaming console such as a 
PS4, which connects to and enables gaming via his/her TV, he/she will not consider that 
PS4 a reasonable substitute for a mobile device like a smartphone, nor would he/she 
consider the version of any game created for his/her PS4 to substitute for the mobile app 
version of such a game.  That is because the portability (and typically for smartphones 
the cellular connectivity) of the mobile devices enable the consumer to play mobile 
games away from home or anywhere in the home.  Indeed, for this reason, game 
developers often distribute multiple versions of a game, each of which is programmed 
for compatibility with a particular type of device and its operating system. 
 Geographic Market Definition 
51. OEMs license mobile OSs for installation on mobile devices 
globally, excluding China.  Google’s operations in China are limited, and it does not 
make available many of its products for mobile devices sold within China.  This is 
based in part on legal and regulatory barriers to the distribution of mobile OS-related 
software imposed by China.  Further, while Google contractually requires OEMs 
licensing Android outside of China not to sell any devices with competing Android-
compatible mobile OSs, it imposes no such restriction on devices sold within China.  
Because the OEMs that sell Android mobile devices both within and outside China have 
committed to this contractual restriction, such OEMs must sell, outside of China, 
devices with Google’s Android OS.  The geographic scope of the relevant Merchant 
Market for Mobile OSs is therefore worldwide, excluding China.   
B. Google’s Monopoly Power in the Merchant Market for Mobile OSs 
52. Google has monopoly power in the Merchant Market for Mobile 
OSs through its Android OS.  As determined by the European Commission during the 
course of its investigation of Android, the Android OS, licensed to OEMs in relevant 
respects by Google, is installed on over 95% of all mobile devices sold by OEMs 
utilizing a merchant mobile OS.  Indeed, Android OS is installed on nearly 75% of all 
smart mobile devices sold by all OEMs, including even those OEMs that use a 
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proprietary mobile OS they developed exclusively for their own use (such as Apple’s 
iOS).   
53. A mobile ecosystem typically develops around one or more mobile 
OSs, such as the Android OS.  The “Android ecosystem” is a system of mobile products 
(such as devices, apps and accessories) designed to be inter-dependent and compatible 
with each other and the Android OS.  Ecosystem participants include an array of 
participating stakeholders, such as Google, OEMs that make Android-compatible 
devices, developers of Android-compatible apps, Android app distribution platforms, 
including app stores, the makers of ancillary hardware such as headphones or speakers, 
cellular carriers, and others.     
54. Mobile ecosystems benefit from substantial network effects—that is, 
the more developers that design useful apps for a specific mobile OS, the more 
consumers will be drawn to use the relevant OS for which those apps are designed; the 
more consumers that use an OS, the more developers want to develop even more apps 
for that OS.  As determined in United States v. Microsoft, Inc., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.), 
new entrants into an operating system market thus face an “applications barrier to 
entry”.  An applications barrier to entry arises because a new operating system will be 
desirable to consumers only if a broad array of software applications can run on it, but 
software developers will find it profitable to create applications that run on an operating 
system only if there is a large existing base of users.    
55. To overcome this challenge and to attract app developers and users, 
Google has continuously represented that Android is an “open” ecosystem and that any 
ecosystem participant could create Android-compatible products without unnecessary 
restrictions.  Indeed, Google LLC’s CEO, Sundar Pichai, represented in 2014 that 
Android “is one of the most open systems that I’ve ever seen”.5  And Andy Rubin, an 
 
5 Stuart Dredge, Google’s Sundar Pichai on wearable tech: ‘We’re just scratching the surface’, The 
Guardian (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/09/google-sundar-
pichai-android-chrome-sxsw.  
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Android founder who is described by some as the “Father of Android”, said when he 
departed Google in 2013 that “at its core, Android has always been about openness”.6  
56. But the reality is quite different.  Despite these claims of openness, 
Google has now effectively closed the Android ecosystem through its tight control of 
the Android OS.  And, as the dominant OS licensor, Google now benefits from these 
substantial network effects which makes participation on its platform a “must-have” 
market for developers.    
57. As further described below, Google uses the Android OS to restrict 
which apps and app stores OEMs are permitted to pre-install on the devices they make 
and to impose deterrents to the direct distribution of competing app stores and apps to 
Android users, all at the expense of competition in the Android ecosystem.   
58. Because of Google’s monopoly power in the Merchant Market for 
Mobile OSs, OEMs, developers and users cannot avoid such effects by choosing 
another mobile OS.  OEMs such as ZTE and Nokia have stated that other non-
proprietary OSs are poor substitutes for the Android OS and are not a reasonable 
alternative to licensing the Android OS.  One important reason is that other mobile OSs 
presently do not support many high-quality and successful mobile apps, which 
consumers find essential or valuable when choosing a mobile device.  These 
circumstances have biased consumers against the purchase of mobile devices with non-
proprietary mobile OSs other than Android OS.  OEMs thus have no choice but to agree 
to Google’s demands because it is critical that they be able to offer a popular mobile OS 
and corresponding ecosystem to consumers who are choosing which mobile device to 
purchase.   
 
6 Andy Rubin, Andy Rubin’s Email to Android Partners, The Wall Street Journal (Mar. 13, 2013), 
available at https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/03/13/andy-rubins-email-to-android-
partners/?mod=WSJBlog. 
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II. Google Unlawfully Maintains a Monopoly in the Android Mobile App 
Distribution Market. 
59. Mobile apps make mobile devices more useful and valuable because 
they add functionality to the mobile device that caters to the specific interests of each 
mobile device user.  For example, they facilitate video chats with friends and family, 
banking online, shopping, job hunting, photo editing, reading digital news sources, 
editing documents, or playing a game like Fortnite.  Many workers use their smart 
mobile device to check work schedules, access company email, or use other employer 
software while outside the workplace.  For many consumers, a smartphone or tablet is 
the only way to access these functions, because the consumer does not own a personal 
computer or because the consumer can only access the Internet using a cellular 
connection.  But even when a consumer can perform the same or similar functions on a 
personal computer, the ability to access apps “on the go” using a handheld, portable 
device remains valuable and important.   
60. Whereas some apps may be pre-installed by OEMs, OEMs cannot 
anticipate all the various apps a specific consumer may desire to use.  Moreover, many 
consumers have different preferences as to which apps they want, and it would be 
undesirable for OEMs to load the devices they sell with unwanted apps that take up 
valuable space on the mobile device.  And many apps that consumers may ultimately 
use on their device will be developed after they buy the device.  Accordingly, 
consumers who seek to add new functionalities to a mobile device and customize the 
device for their own use need to obtain and install mobile apps themselves after 
purchasing their device.  Currently, on Android devices, this is done most often through 
the Google Play Store, Google’s own “app store”.  The Google Play Store is a digital 
portal set up by Google and through which mobile apps can be browsed, searched for, 
purchased (if necessary), and downloaded by a consumer.  App stores such as the 
Google Play Store, alongside several other ways by which apps can be distributed to the 
hundreds of millions of consumers using Android-based mobile devices, comprise the 
Android App Distribution Market, defined below.   
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61. Through various anti-competitive acts and unlawful restraints on 
competition, Google has maintained a monopoly in the Android Mobile App 
Distribution market, causing ongoing harm to competition and injury to OEMs, app 
distributors, app developers, and consumers.  Google’s restraints of trade belie 
representations Google currently makes to developers that “as an open platform, 
Android is about choice” and that app developers “can distribute [their] Android apps to 
users in any way [they] want, using any distribution approach or combination of 
approaches that meets [their] needs”, including by allowing users to directly download 
apps “from a website” or even by “emailing them directly to consumers”.7   
A. The Android App Distribution Market 
 Product Market Definition 
62. There is a relevant market for the distribution of apps compatible 
with the Android OS to users of mobile devices (the “Android App Distribution 
Market”).  This Market is comprised of all the channels by which mobile apps may be 
distributed to the hundreds of millions of users of mobile devices running the Android 
OS.  The Market primarily includes Google’s dominant Google Play Store, with smaller 
stores, such as Samsung’s Galaxy Store and Aptoide, trailing far behind.  Nominally 
only, the direct downloading of apps without using an app store (which Google 
pejoratively describes as “sideloading”) is also within this market.   
63. App stores allow consumers to easily browse, search for, access 
reviews on, purchase (if necessary), download, and install mobile apps, using the mobile 
device itself and an Internet connection.  OEMs find it commercially unreasonable to 
ship a smart mobile device to a consumer without at least one app store installed, as a 
consumer’s ability to obtain new mobile apps is an important part of the value provided 
by smart mobile devices.   
 
7 Google Play Developers Page, Alternative distribution options, 
https://developer.android.com/distribute/marketing-tools/alternative-distribution (last accessed June 7, 
2020). 
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64. App stores are OS-specific, meaning they distribute only apps that 
are compatible with the specific mobile OS on which the app store is used.  A consumer 
who has a mobile device running the Android OS cannot use apps created for a different 
mobile operating system.  An owner of an Android OS device will use an Android 
compatible app store, and such app stores distribute only Android-compatible mobile 
apps.  That consumer may not substitute an Android app store with, for example, 
Apple’s App Store, as that app store is not available on Android devices, is not 
compatible with the Android OS, and does not offer apps that are compatible with the 
Android OS.  Non-Android mobile app distribution platforms—such as the Windows 
Mobile Store used on Microsoft’s Windows Mobile OS or the Apple App Store used on 
Apple iOS devices—cannot substitute for Android-specific app distribution platforms, 
and they are therefore not part of the Android App Distribution Market defined herein.   
65. Likewise, stores distributing personal computer or gaming console 
software are not compatible with the Android OS and do not offer Android-compatible 
apps:  the Epic Games Store distributes software compatible with personal computers, 
the Microsoft Store for Xbox distributes software compatible with the Xbox game 
consoles, and the PlayStation Store distributes software compatible with the PlayStation 
game consoles.  A user cannot download mobile apps for use on his/her Android device 
by using such non-Android OS, non-mobile software distribution platforms.  They 
therefore are not part of the Android App Distribution Market.   
66. The same is true even when an app or game, like Fortnite, is 
available for different types of platforms running different operating systems, because 
only the OS-compatible version of that software can run on a specific type of device or 
computer.  Accordingly, as a commercial reality, an app developer that wishes to 
distribute mobile apps for Android mobile devices must develop an Android-specific 
version of the app and avail itself of the Android App Distribution Market.   
67. In the alternative only, the Android App Distribution Market is a 
relevant, economically distinct sub-market of a hypothetical broader antitrust market for 
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the distribution of mobile apps to users of all mobile devices, whether Android or 
Apple’s iOS.   
 Geographic Market Definition 
68. The geographic scope of the Android App Distribution Market is 
worldwide, excluding China.  Outside of China, app distribution channels, including app 
stores, are developed and distributed on a global basis; OEMs, in turn, make app stores, 
such as the Google Play Store, available on Android devices on a worldwide basis 
(except in China).  China is excluded from the relevant market because legal and 
regulatory barriers prevent the operation of many global app stores, including the 
Google Play Store, within China.  Additionally, app stores prevalent in China are not 
available, or have little presence, outside of China.  
B. Google’s Monopoly Power in the Android App Distribution Market 
69. Google has monopoly power in the Android App Distribution 
Market. 
70. Google’s monopoly power can be demonstrated by, among other 
things, Google’s massive market share in terms of apps downloaded.  The European 
Commission determined that, within the Market, more than 90% of app downloads 
through app stores have been done through the Google Play Store.  Indeed, although app 
stores for merchant mobile OSs other than Android are not included in the Android App 
Distribution Market, the European Commission found that the only such app store with 
any appreciable presence was the Windows Mobile Store, which was compatible with 
the Windows Mobile OS.  The Commission determined that even if the Windows 
Mobile Store share was included in the market, the Google Play Store would still have 
had a market share greater than 90%.  
71. Other existing Android mobile app stores do not discipline Google’s 
exercise of monopoly power in the Android App Distribution Market.  No other app 
store is able to reach nearly as many Android users as the Google Play Store.  
According to the European Commission, the Google Play Store is pre-installed by 
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OEMs on practically all Android mobile devices sold outside of China.  As a result, no 
other Android app store comes close to that number of pre-installed users.  With the 
exception of app stores designed for and installed only on mobile devices sold by those 
respective OEMs, such as Samsung Galaxy Apps and the LG Electronics App Store, no 
other Android app store is pre-installed on more than 10% of Android devices, and 
many have no appreciable market penetration at all.  Aptoide, for example, is an 
Android app store that claims to be the largest “independent” app store outside of China, 
but it comes pre-installed on no more than 5% of Android mobile devices.   
72. Because of Google’s success in maintaining its monopoly in Android 
app distribution, there is no viable substitute to distributing Android apps through the 
Google Play Store.  As a result, the Google Play Store offers over 3 million apps, 
including all of the most popular Android apps, compared to just 700,000 apps offered 
by Aptoide, the Android app store with the next largest listing.  The Google Play Store 
thereby benefits from ongoing network effects based on the large number of 
participating app developers and users.  The large number of apps attracts large numbers 
of users, who value access to a broad range of apps, and the large number of users 
attract app developers who wish to access more Android users.  Android OEMs too find 
it commercially unreasonable to make and sell phones without the Google Play Store, 
and they view other app stores as poor substitutes for the Google Play Store because of 
the lower number and lesser quality of apps they offer.   
73. As further proof of its monopoly power, Google imposes a supra-
competitive commission of 30% on the price of apps purchased through the Google Play 
Store, which is a far higher commission than would exist under competitive conditions.  
74. Furthermore, Google’s monopoly power in app distribution is not 
constrained by competition at the smart mobile device level because Android device 
users face significant switching costs and lock-in to the Android ecosystems that serves 
to protect Google’s monopoly power, and consumers are unable to account for Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct when they purchase a smart mobile device.    
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75. First, consumers are deterred from leaving the Android ecosystem 
due to the difficulty and costs of switching.  Consumers choose a smartphone based in 
part on the OS that comes pre-installed on that device and the ecosystem in which the 
device participates (in addition to a bundle of other features, such as price, battery life, 
design, storage space, and the range of available apps and accessories).  Once a 
consumer has selected a smartphone, the consumer cannot replace the mobile OS that 
comes pre-installed on it with an alternative mobile OS.  Rather, a consumer who 
wishes to change the OS must purchase a new smartphone entirely.  In addition, mobile 
OSs have different designs, controls, and functions that consumers must learn to 
navigate.  Over time, consumers who use Android devices learn to operate efficiently on 
the Android OS.  For example, the Android OS layout differs from iOS in a wide range 
of functions, including key features such as searching and installing “widgets” on the 
phone, organizing and searching the phone’s digital content, configuring control center 
settings, and organizing photos.  The cost of learning to use a different mobile OS is 
part of consumers’ switching costs.     
76. Second, switching from Android devices may also result in a 
significant loss of personal and financial investment that consumers put into the 
Android ecosystem.  Because apps, in-app content and many other products are 
designed for or are only compatible with a particular mobile OS, switching to a new 
mobile OS may mean losing access to such products or to data.  Even if versions of such 
apps and products are available within the new ecosystem chosen by the consumer, the 
consumer would have to go through the process of downloading them again onto the 
new devices and may have to purchase them anew.  As a result, the consumer may be 
forced to abandon his or her investment in at least some of those apps, along with any 
purchased in-app content and consumer-generated data on those apps.  
77. Third, consumers are not able to avoid the switching costs and lock-
in to the Android OS ecosystem by acquiring more information prior to the purchase of 
the Android device.  The vast majority of mobile device consumers have no reason to 
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inquire, and therefore do not know about, Google’s anticompetitive contractual 
restraints and policies.  Furthermore, these consumers rationally do not give much 
weight to Google’s anticompetitive conduct and anticompetitive fees when deciding 
whether to switch from an Android device.  Consumers consider many features when 
deciding which smartphone or tablet to purchase, including design, brand, processing 
power, battery life, functionality and cellular plan.  These features are likely to play a 
substantially larger role in a consumer’s decision as to which smart mobile device to 
purchase than Google’s anticompetitive conduct in the relevant markets, particularly 
given that a consumer may consider the direct monetary cost of Google’s conduct to be 
small relative to the price of smart mobile devices, if the consumer is even aware of the 
conduct or assigns it such a cost at all.  For example, over time a typical Android user 
may make multiple small purchases of paid apps and in-app digital content—
accumulating to $100 or less annually—but may spend several hundreds of dollars at 
once to purchase an Android smart mobile device.   
78. Consumers are also unable to determine the “lifecycle price” of 
devices—i.e., to accurately assess at the point of purchase how much they will end up 
spending in total (including on the device and all apps and in-app purchases) for the 
duration of their ownership of the device.  Consumers cannot know in advance of 
purchasing a device all of the apps or in-app content that they may want to purchase 
during the usable lifetime of the device.  Consumers’ circumstances may change.  
Consumers may develop new interests.  They may learn about new apps or in-app 
content that becomes available only after purchasing a device.  New apps and in-app 
content will continue to be developed and marketed after a consumer purchases a 
smartphone or tablet.  All of these factors may influence the amount of consumers’ app 
and in-app purchases.  Because they cannot know or predict all such factors when 
purchasing mobile devices, consumers are unable to calculate the lifecycle prices of the 
devices.  This prevents consumers from effectively taking Google’s anticompetitive 
conduct into account when making mobile device purchasing decisions.  
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79. Because consumers face substantial switching costs and lock-in to 
the Android OS, developers can only gain access to these users by also participating in 
the Android ecosystem.  Thus, developers face an even greater cost in not participating 
in the Android ecosystem—loss of access to hundreds of millions of Android OS users.  
C. Google’s Anti-Competitive Conduct Concerning the Android App 
Distribution Market 
80. Google has willfully and unlawfully maintained its monopoly in the 
Android App Distribution Market through a series of related anti-competitive acts that 
have foreclosed competing ways of distributing apps to Android users.   
 Google’s Conduct Toward OEMs 
81. Google imposes anti-competitive constraints on Android OEMs 
based on their need for access to a viable Android app store and other important services 
provided by Google.   
82. First, Google conditions OEMs’ licensing of the Google Play Store, 
as well as other essential Google services and the Android trademark, on OEMs’ 
agreements to provide the Google Play Store with preferential treatment compared to 
any other competing app store.  Specifically, to access the Google Play Store, Android 
OEMs (which, as noted above, comprise virtually all OEMs that obtain an OS on the 
merchant market) have signed a Mobile Application Distribution Agreement 
(“MADA”) with Google.  A MADA confers a license to a bundle of products 
comprising proprietary Google apps, Google-supplied services necessary for 
functioning of mobile apps, and the Android trademark.  Through its MADAs with 
Android OEMs, Google requires OEMs to locate the Google Play Store on the “home 
screen”8 of each mobile device.  Android OEMs must further pre-install up to 30 
Google mandatory apps and must locate these apps on the home screen or on the next 
screen, occupying valuable space on each user’s mobile device that otherwise could be 
occupied by competing app stores and other services.  These requirements ensure that 
 
8 The default “home screen” is the default display, prior to any changes made by users, that appears 
without scrolling when the device is in active idle mode (i.e., is not turned off or in sleep mode).   
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the Google Play Store is the most visible app store any user encounters and place any 
other app store at a significant disadvantage.   
83. Absent this restraint, OEMs could pre-install and prominently 
display alternative app stores to the purchasers of some or all of their mobile devices, 
allowing competing app stores the ability to vie for prominent placement on Android 
devices, increased exposure to consumers and, as a result, increased ability to attract app 
developers to their store.  As an app distributor, Epic could and would negotiate with 
OEMs to offer a prominently displayed app store containing Fortnite and other games, 
allowing Epic to reach more mobile users.    
84. Second, Google interferes with OEMs’ ability to distribute Android 
app stores and apps directly to consumers outside the Google Play Store.  Some OEMs 
may choose to compete for buyers by offering mobile devices that provide easy access 
to additional mobile app stores and apps.  For example, an OEM may pre-install an icon 
corresponding to an app store or app on the device before it is sold to consumers.  Even 
when an OEM would want to make mobile apps available to consumers in this way, 
Google imposes unjustified and pretextual warnings about the security of installing the 
app, even though the consumer is choosing to install the app in full awareness of its 
source.   
85. Epic recently reached an agreement with OnePlus, an OEM, to allow 
users of OnePlus mobile devices to seamlessly install Fortnite and other Epic games by 
touching an Epic Games app on their devices—without encountering any obstacles 
imposed by the Android OS.  In conjunction with this agreement, Epic designed a 
version of Fortnite for certain OnePlus devices that delivers a state-of-the-art framerate 
(the frequency at which consecutive images appear on the device’s screen), providing an 
even better gameplay experience for Fortnite players.  Although the original agreement 
between Epic and OnePlus contemplated making this installation method available 
worldwide, Google demanded that OnePlus not implement its agreement with Epic with 
the limited exception of mobile devices sold in India.  OnePlus informed Epic that 
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Google was “particularly concerned that the Epic Games app would have ability to 
potentially install and update multiple games with a silent install bypassing the Google 
Play Store”.9  Further, any waiver of Google’s restriction “would be rejected due to the 
Epic Games app serving as a potential portfolio of games and game updates”.  As a 
result, OnePlus mobile device users in India can install Epic games seamlessly without 
using the Google Play Store, while users outside India cannot.   
86. Another OEM, LG, also told Epic that it had a contract with Google 
“to block side downloading off Google Play Store this year”, but that the OEM could 
“surely” make Epic games available to consumers if the Google Play Store were used.  
Google prevented LG from pre-installing the Epic Games app on LG devices.   
87. In the absence of this conduct, Epic could and would negotiate with 
OEMs to make Fortnite and other Epic games directly available to consumers, free from 
Google’s anti-competitive restraints.  OEMs could then compete for the sale of mobile 
devices based in part on the set of apps offered on the OEMs’ devices.  But Google 
forecloses alternative ways of distributing Android apps other than through its own 
monopolized app store, harming competition among OEMs and among app developers, 
to the detriment of consumers. 
 Google’s Conduct Toward App Distributors and Developers 
88. Google imposes anti-competitive restrictions on competing app 
distributors and developers that further entrench its monopoly in Android App 
Distribution.     
89. First, Google prevents app distributors from providing Android users 
ready access to competing app stores.  Specifically, even though competitive app stores 
themselves are mobile apps that could easily be distributed through the Google Play 
Store, Google prohibits the distribution of any competing app store through the Google 
Play Store, without any technological or other justification.   
 
9  A “silent install” is an installation process free of the dire security warnings that Google triggers 
when apps are directly downloaded, such as the “one touch” process on which Epic and OnePlus had 
agreed.  
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90. Google imposes this restraint through provisions of the Google Play 
Developer Distribution Agreement (“DDA”), which Google requires all app developers 
to sign before they can distribute their apps through the Google Play Store.  Each of the 
Defendants, except Google Payment, is a party to the DDA. 
91. Section 4.5 of the DDA provides that developers “may not use 
Google Play to distribute or make available any Product that has a purpose that 
facilitates the distribution of software applications and games for use on Android 
devices outside of Google Play.”  The DDA further reserves to Google the right to 
remove and disable any Android app that it determines violates this requirement.  The 
DDA is non-negotiable, and developers that seek access to Android users through the 
Google Play Store must accept Google’s standardized contract of adhesion.  
92. In the absence of these unlawful restraints, competing app 
distributors could allow users to replace or supplement the Google Play Store on their 
devices with competing app stores, which users could easily download and install 
through the Google Play Store.  App stores could compete and benefit consumers by 
offering lower prices and innovative app store models, such as app stores that are 
curated to specific consumers’ interests—e.g., an app store that specializes in games or 
an app store that only offers apps that increase productivity.  Without Google’s unlawful 
restraints, additional app stores would provide additional platforms on which more apps 
could be featured, and thereby, discovered by consumers.  Epic has been damaged 
through its inability to provide a competing app store (as it does on personal computers) 
and by the loss of the opportunity to reach more Android users directly in the ways that 
personal computers allow developers to reach consumers without artificial constraints.  
93. Second, Google conditions app developers’ ability to effectively 
advertise their apps to Android users on being listed in the Google Play Store.  
Specifically, Google markets an App Campaigns program that, as Google says, allows 
app developers to “get your app into the hands of more paying users” by “streamlin[ing] 
the process for you, making it easy to promote your apps across Google’s largest 
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properties”.  This includes certain ad placements on Google Search, YouTube, Discover 
on Google Search, and the Google Display Network, and with Google’s “search 
partners”, that are specially optimized for the advertising of mobile apps.  However, in 
order to access this valuable advertising space through the App Campaigns program, 
Google requires that app developers list their app in either the Google Play Store (to 
reach Android users) or in the Apple App Store (to reach Apple iOS users).  This 
conduct further entrenches Google’s monopoly in Android App Distribution by 
coercing Android app developers to list their apps in the Google Play Store or risk 
losing access to a great many Android users they could otherwise advertise to but for 
Google’s restrictions.     
 Google’s Conduct Toward Consumers 
94. Google directly and anti-competitively restricts the manner in which 
consumers can discover, download and install mobile apps and app stores.  Although 
Google nominally allows consumers to directly download and install Android apps and 
app stores—a process that Google pejoratively describes as “sideloading”—Google has 
ensured, through a series of technological impediments imposed by the Android OS, 
that direct downloading remains untenable for most consumers.   
95. But for Google’s anticompetitive acts, Android users could freely 
download apps from developers’ websites, rather than through an app store, just as they 
might do on a personal computer.  There is no reason that downloading and installing an 
app on a mobile device should differ from downloading and installing software on a 
personal computer.  Millions of personal computer users download and install software 
directly every day, such as Google’s own Chrome browser or Adobe’s Acrobat Reader.  
Personal computer users do this easily and safely. 
96. Direct downloading on Android mobile devices, however, differs 
dramatically.  Google ensures that the Android process is technically complex, 
confusing and threatening, filled with dire warnings that scare most consumers into 
abandoning the lengthy process.  For example, depending on the version of Android 
Case 3:20-cv-05671   Document 1   Filed 08/13/20   Page 33 of 63
 
 






























running on a mobile device, downloading and installing Fortnite on an Android device 
could take as many as 16 steps or more, including requiring the user to make changes to 
the device’s default settings and manually granting various permissions while being 
warned that doing so is dangerous.  Below are the myriad steps an average Android user 
has to go through in order to download and install Fortnite directly from Epic’s secure 
servers.  
97. Below are two of the intimidating messages and warnings about the 
supposed danger of directly downloading and installing apps that consumers encounter 
during this process.   
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98. As if this slog through warnings and threats were not enough to 
ensure the inferiority of direct downloading as a distribution method for Android apps, 
Google denies downloaded apps the permissions necessary to be seamlessly updated in 
the background—instead allows such updates only for apps downloaded via Google 
Play Store.  The result is that consumers must manually approve every update of a 
“sideloaded” app.  In addition, depending on the OS version and selected settings, such 
updates may require users to go through many of the steps in the downloading process 
repeatedly, again triggering many of the same warnings.  This imposes onerous 
obstacles on consumers who wish to keep the most current version of an app on their 
mobile device and further drives consumers away from direct downloading and toward 
Google’s monopolized app store. 
99. Further, under the guise of offering protection from malware, Google 
further restricts direct downloading.  When Google deems an app “harmful”, Google 
may prevent the installation of, prompt a consumer to uninstall, or forcibly remove the 
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app from a consumer’s device.  And direct downloading has been prevented entirely on 
the Android devices that are part of Google’s so-called Advanced Protection Program 
(“APP”).  Consumers who have enrolled in APP are unable to directly download apps; 
their Android device can only download apps distributed in the Google Play Store or in 
another pre-installed app store that Google has pre-approved for an OEM to offer on its 
devices.  App developers therefore cannot reach APP users unless they first agree to 
distribute their apps through the Google Play Store or through a separate Google-
approved, OEM-offered app store, where available.  Google’s invocation of security is 
an excuse to further strangle an app developer’s ability to reach Android users, as shown 
by a comparison to personal computers, where users can securely purchase and 
download new software without being limited to a single software store owned or 
approved by the user’s anti-virus software vendor.  
100. Direct downloading is also nominally available to competing app 
distributors who seek to distribute competing Android app stores directly to consumers.  
However, the same restrictions Google imposes on the direct downloading of apps apply 
to the direct downloading of app stores.  Indeed, Google Play Protect has flagged at 
least one competing Android app store, Aptoide, as “harmful”, further hindering 
consumers’ ability to access a competing app store.   
101. And apps downloaded from “sideloaded” app stores, like apps 
directly downloaded from a developer’s website, may not be automatically uploaded in 
the background.  Thus, direct downloading is not a viable way for app stores to reach 
Android users, any more than it is a viable alternative for single apps; the only 
difference is that the former do not have any alternative, ensuring the latter are forced 
into the Google Play Store. 
102. But for Google’s restrictions on direct downloading, Epic and other 
app distributors and developers could try to directly distribute their stores and apps to 
those consumers who would be open to a process outside an established app store.  But 
as explained above, Google makes direct downloading substantially and unnecessarily 
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difficult, and in some cases prevents it entirely, further narrowing this already narrow 
alternative distribution channel.   
103. There is no legitimate reason for Google’s conduct.  Indeed, for 
decades the users of personal computers have been able to install software acquired 
from various sources without being deterred by anything like the obstacles erected by 
Google.  Now, a user can navigate to the Internet webpage sponsored by the developer 
of software he/she desires, click once or twice to download and install an application, 
and be up and running, often in a matter of minutes.  The operating systems used by 
personal computers efficiently facilitate this download and installation (unlike Android), 
and security screening is conducted by a neutral security software operating in the 
background, allowing users to download software from any source they choose (unlike 
Android).   
104. Google’s anti-competitive and unjustified restrictions on distributing 
apps through any means other than its own app store contradict its own claims that 
Android app developers can “us[e] any distribution approach or combination of 
approaches that meets your needs”, and that developers can even provide consumers 
“apps from a website or [by] emailing them directly to users.”10  In reality, Google 
specifically prevents app developers from effectively availing themselves of alternative 
distribution channels that it touts today.   
105. Through these anti-competitive acts, including contractual provisions 
and exclusionary obstacles, Google has willfully obtained a near-absolute monopoly 
over Android mobile app distribution.  Google Play Store downloads have accounted for 
more than 90% of downloads through Android app stores, dwarfing other available 
distribution channels.  
 
10 Google Play Developers Page, Alternative distribution options, 
https://developer.android.com/distribute/marketing-tools/alternative-distribution (last accessed June 7, 
2020). 
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D. Anti-Competitive Effects in the Android App Distribution Market 
106. Google’s anti-competitive conduct forecloses competition in the 
Android App Distribution Market, affects a substantial volume of commerce in this 
Market and causes anti-competitive harms to OEMs, competing mobile app distributors, 
mobile app developers, and consumers.   
107. Google’s conduct harms OEMs by forcing them to dedicate to the 
Google Play Store and other mandatory Google applications valuable space on their 
devices’ “home screen”, even if they would rather use that real estate for other purposes, 
including to offer alternative app stores.  Individually and together, these requirements 
limit OEMs’ ability to innovate and compete with each other by offering innovative and 
more appealing (in terms of price and quality) distribution platforms for mobile apps.  
Google’s restrictions also interfere with OEMs’ ability to compete with each other by 
offering Android devices with tailored combinations of pre-installed apps that would 
appeal to particular subsets of mobile device consumers.   
108. Google’s conduct harms would-be competitor app distributors, such 
as Epic, which could otherwise innovate new models of app distribution and provide 
OEMs, app developers, and consumers choice beyond Google’s own app store. 
109. Google’s anti-competitive conduct harms app developers, such as 
Epic, which are forced to agree to Google’s anti-competitive terms and conditions if 
they wish to reach many Android users, such as through advertising on Google’s 
valuable advertising properties.  Google’s restrictions prevent developers from 
experimenting with alternative app distribution models, such as providing apps directly 
to consumers, selling apps through curated app stores, creating their own competing app 
stores, or forming business relationships with OEMs who can pre-install apps.  By 
restricting developers in such a way, Google ensures that the developer’s apps will be 
distributed on the Google Play Store, and that Google is then able to monitor and collect 
a variety of information on the apps’ usage, which it can then use to develop and offer 
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its own competing apps that are, of course, not subject to Google’s supra-competitive 
taxes.  
110. Both developers and consumers are harmed by Google’s supra-
competitive taxes of 30% on the purchase price of apps distributed through the Google 
Play Store, which is a much higher transaction fee than would exist in a competitive 
market.  Google’s supra-competitive taxes raise prices for app developers and 
consumers and reduce the output of mobile apps and related content by depriving app 
developers incentive and capital to develop new apps and content.   
111. Consumers are further harmed because Google’s control of app 
distribution reduces developers’ ability and incentive to distribute apps to consumers in 
different and innovative ways—for example, through genre-specific app stores.  Google, 
by restraining the distribution market and eliminating the ability and incentive for 
competing app stores, also limits consumers’ ability to discover new apps of interest to 
them.  More competing app stores would permit additional platforms to feature diverse 
collections of apps.  Instead, consumers are left to sift through millions of apps in one 
monopolized app store, where Google controls which apps are featured and which apps 
are identified or prioritized in user searches.     
III. Google Unlawfully Acquired and Maintains a Monopoly in the Android In-
App Payment Processing Market.  
112. By selling digital content within a mobile app rather than (or in 
addition to) charging a price for the app itself, app developers can make an app widely 
accessible to all users, then charge users for additional digital content or features, thus 
still generating revenue from their investment in developing new apps and content.  This 
is especially true for mobile game developers.  By allowing users to play without up-
front costs, developers permit more players try a game “risk free” and only pay for what 
they want to access.  Fortnite, for example, is free to download and play, but makes 
additional content available for in-app purchasing on an à la carte basis or via a 
subscription-based Battle Pass.  App developers who sell digital content rely on in-app 
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payment processing tools to process consumers’ purchases in a seamless and efficient 
manner.   
113. When selling digital content, Android app developers are unable to 
utilize the multitude of electronic payment processing solutions generally available on 
the market to process other types of transactions.  Instead, through contractual 
restrictions and its monopoly in app distribution, Google coerces developers into using 
its own in-app payment processing by conditioning developers’ use of Google’s 
dominant Google Play Store on the use of Google’s payment processor, Google Play 
Billing, for digital content, thereby acquiring and maintaining monopoly power in the 
Android In-App Payment Processing Market.  Google thus ties its Google Play Store to 
its own proprietary payment processing tool.   
A. The Android In-App Payment Processing Market 
 Product Market Definition 
114. There is a relevant antitrust market for the processing of payments 
for the purchase of digital content, including virtual gaming products, that is consumed 
within Android apps (the “Android In-App Payment Processing Market”).  The Android 
In-App Payment Processing Market is comprised of the payment processing solutions 
that Android developers could turn to and integrate into their Android apps to process 
the purchase of such in-app digital content.   
115. Absent Google’s unlawful conduct, app developers could integrate 
compatible payment processor into their apps to facilitate the purchase of in-app digital 
content.  Developers also would have the capability to develop their own in-app 
payment processing functionality.  And developers could offer users a choice among 
multiple payment processors for each purchase, just like a website or brick-and-mortar 
store can offer a customer the option of using Visa, MasterCard, Amex, Google Pay, 
and more.   
116. Google offers separate payment solutions for the purchase of digital 
content than it does for other types of purchases, even within mobile apps.  Google Play 
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Billing can be used for the purchase of digital content and virtual gaming products, 
while Google offers a separate tool, Google Pay, to facilitate the purchase of physical 
products and services within apps.   
117. It is particularly important that app developers who sell in-app digital 
content be able to offer in-app transactions that are seamless, engrossing, quick, and fun.  
For example, a gamer who encounters a desirable “skin” within Fortnite, such as a 
Marvel superhero, may purchase it nearly instantly for a small price without leaving the 
app.  Although Fortnite does not offer content that extends gameplay or gives players 
competitive advantages, other game developers offer such products—for example, 
“boosts” and “extra lives”—that extend and enhance gameplay.  It is critical that such 
purchases can be made during gameplay itself, rather than in another manner.  If a 
player were required to purchase game-extending extra lives outside of the app, the 
player may simply stop playing instead.   
118. As another example, if a user of a mobile dating app encounters a 
particularly desirable potential dating partner, he/she can do more than “swipe right” or 
“like” that person, but can also purchase a digital item that increases the likelihood that 
the potential partner will notice his/her profile.  If the user could not make that purchase 
quickly and seamlessly, he/she would likely abandon the purchase and may even stop 
“swiping” in the app altogether.   
119. It is therefore essential that developers who offer digital content be 
able to seamlessly integrate a payment processing solution into the app, rather than 
requiring a consumer to go elsewhere, such as to a separate website, to process a 
transaction.  Indeed, if an app user were directed to process a purchase of digital content 
outside of a mobile app, the user might abandon the purchase or stop interacting with 
the mobile app altogether.   
120. Mobile game developers particularly value the ability to allow users 
to make purchases that extend or enhance gameplay without disrupting or delaying that 
gameplay or a gamer’s engagement with the mobile app.  For these reasons, and in the 
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alternative, there is a relevant antitrust sub-market for the processing of payments for 
the purchase of virtual gaming products within mobile Android games (the “Android 
Games Payment Processing Market”). 
 Geographic Market Definition 
121. The geographic scope of the Android In-App Payment Processing 
Market is worldwide, excluding China.  Outside China, in-app payment processing 
tools, such as Google Play Billing, are available on a worldwide basis.  By contrast, in-
app payment processing tools available in China are not available outside of China, 
including because Google prevents the use of non-Google payment processing tools for 
all apps distributed through the Google Play Store, which as noted above dominates 
distribution of apps outside of China.  
B. Google’s Monopoly Power in the Android In-App Payment Processing 
Market 
122. Google has monopoly power in the Android In-App Payment 
Processing Market and, in the alternative, in the Android Games Payment Processing 
Market.   
123. For apps distributed through the Google Play Store, Google requires 
that the apps use only its own in-app payment processor, Google Play Billing, to process 
in-app purchases of digital content and for all purchases within Android games.  And 
because 90% or more of Android-compatible mobile app downloads conducted through 
an app stores have been done through the Google Play Store, Google has a monopoly in 
these Markets.  . 
124. Google charges a 30% commission for Google Play Billing.  This 
rate reflects Google’s market power, which allows it to charge supra-competitive prices 
for payment processing within the market.  Indeed, the cost of alternative electronic 
payment processing tools, which Google does not permit to be used for the purchase of 
in-app digital content or within Android games, can be one tenth of the 30% cost of 
Google Play Billing. 
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C. Google’s Anti-Competitive Conduct Concerning the Android In-App 
Payment Processing Market 
125. Through provisions of the DDA that Google imposes on all 
developers who seek to access Android users, Google unlawfully ties its Google Play 
Store, through which it has a monopoly in the Android App Distribution Market, to its 
own in-app payment processing tool, Google Play Billing.  Section 3.2 of the DDA 
requires that Android app developers enter into a separate agreement with Google’s 
payment processor, Defendant Google Payment, in order to receive payment for apps 
and in-app digital content.   
126. Further, Google’s Developer Program Policies, compliance with 
which Section 4.1 of the DDA makes obligatory, require in relevant part that: 
 Developers offering products within a game downloaded on Google 
Play or providing access to game content must use Google Play In-
app Billing as the method of payment. 
 Developers offering products within another category of app 
downloaded on Google Play must use Google Play In-app Billing as 
the method of payment, except for the following cases:  
o Payment is solely for physical products, 
o Payment is for digital content that may be consumed outside 
of the app itself (e.g., songs that can be played on other music 
players). 
127. Google’s unlawful restraints in the DDA prevent app developers 
from integrating alternative, even multiple, payment processing solutions into their 
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mobile apps, depriving app developers and consumers alike a choice of competing 
payment processors.  For example, Epic offers its own in-app payment processing tool 
that it could integrate, alongside Google’s and others, into Epic mobile games.  Epic 
consumers could then choose to process their payment using Google’s tool, Epic’s tool, 
or another tool altogether.   
128. In December of 2019, Epic submitted a build of Fortnite to Google 
Play that enabled users to make in-app purchases through Epic’s own payment 
processor.  Upon review of the submission, Google Play rejected the application, citing 
its violation of Google’s Payments policy as well as an unrelated issue raised by 
Google.  In January 2020, Epic again submitted a Fortnite build that resolved the 
unrelated issue but again enabled users to use Epic’s own payment processor.  Google 
again rejected Epic’s submission.   
129. Epic was prevented from offering Fortnite on the Google Play Store, 
and therefore unable to reach many Android users, until it submitted a new version of 
Fortnite that only offered Google Play Billing.  Google has damaged Epic by 
foreclosing it from the Android in-app payment processing market.  
130. Google has no legitimate justifications for its tie.  If it were 
concerned, for example, about the security of its users’ payment information, then it 
would not permit alternative payment processing for certain transactions made on 
Android phones for physical products or digital content consumed outside an app.  But 
Google does allow alternative payment processing tools in that context, with no 
diminution in security. 
D. Anti-Competitive Effects in the Android In-App Payment Processing 
Market 
131. Google’s conduct harms competition in the Android In-app Payment 
Processing Market (and, in the alternative, in the Android Games Payment Processing 
Market) and injures app developers, consumers, and competing in-app payment 
processors.   
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132. Google’s conduct harms would-be competitor in-app payment 
processors, who would otherwise have the ability to innovate and offer consumers 
alternative payment processing tools that offer better functionality, lower prices, and 
better security.  For example, in the absence of Google’s Developer Program Policies, 
Epic could offer consumers a choice of in-app payment processor for each purchase 
made by the consumer, including a choice of Epic’s own payment processor at a lower 
cost and with better customer service.   
133. Google also harms app developers and consumers by inserting itself 
as a mandatory middleman in every in-app transaction.  When Google acts as payment 
processor, Epic is unable to provide users comprehensive customer service relating to 
in-app payments without Google’s involvement.  Google has little incentive to compete 
through improved customer service because Google faces no competition and 
consumers often blame Epic for payment-related problems.  In addition, Google is able 
to obtain information concerning Epic’s transactions with its own customers, which it 
could use to give its ads and Search businesses an anti-competitive edge, even when 
Epic and its own customers would prefer not to share their information with Google.  In 
these ways and in others, Google directly harms app developers’ relationships with the 
users of their apps.   
134. Finally, Google raises app developers’ costs and consumer prices 
through its supra-competitive 30% tax on in-app purchases, a price it could not maintain 
if it had not foreclosed competition for such transactions.  The resulting increase in 
prices for in-app content likely deters some consumers from making purchases and 
deprives app developers of resources they could use to develop new apps and content.  
The supra-competitive tax rate also reduces developers’ incentive to invest in and create 
additional apps and related in-app content. 
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COUNT 1:  Sherman Act § 2 
(Unlawful Monopoly Maintenance in the  
Android App Distribution Market) 
(against all Defendants except Google Payment) 
135. Epic restates, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
136. Google’s conduct violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits the “monopoliz[ation of] any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations”.  15 U.S.C. § 2.  
137. The Android App Distribution Market is a valid antitrust market. 
138. Google holds monopoly power in the Android App Distribution 
Market.   
139. Google has unlawfully maintained monopoly power in the Android 
App Distribution Market through the anti-competitive acts described herein, including 
conditioning the licensing of the Google Play Store, as well as other essential Google 
services and the Android trademark, on OEMs’ agreement to provide the Google Play 
Store with preferential treatment, imposing technical restrictions and obstacles on both 
OEMs and developers, which prevent the distribution of Android apps through means 
other than the Google Play Store, and conditioning app developers’ ability to effectively 
advertise their apps to Android users on being listed in the Google Play Store.   
140. Google’s conduct affects a substantial volume of interstate as well as 
foreign commerce. 
141. Google’s conduct has substantial anti-competitive effects, including 
increased prices and costs, reduced innovation and quality of service, and lowered 
output. 
142. As a potential competing app distributor and as an app developer, 
Epic has been harmed by Defendants’ anti-competitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent.  Epic has suffered and continues to suffer 
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damages and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an 
injunction ending Google’s anti-competitive conduct issues.  
COUNT 2:  Sherman Act § 1  
(Unreasonable restraints of trade concerning  
Android App Distribution Market:  OEMs) 
(against all Defendants except Google Payment) 
143. Epic restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
144. Defendants’ conduct violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”.   
15 U.S.C. § 1.  
145. Google has entered into agreements with OEMs that unreasonably 
restrict competition in the Android App Distribution Market.  These include MADAs 
with OEMs that condition their access to the Google Play Store and other “must have” 
Google services on the OEM offering the Google Play Store as the primary and often 
the only viable app store on Android mobile devices.   
146. These agreements serve no legitimate or pro-competitive purpose 
that could justify their anti-competitive effects, and thus unreasonably restrain 
competition in the Android App Distribution Market.   
147. Google’s conduct affects a substantial volume of interstate as well as 
foreign commerce. 
148. Google’s conduct has substantial anti-competitive effects, including 
increased prices and costs, reduced innovation and quality of service, and lowered 
output. 
149. As a potential competing app distributor and as an app developer that 
consumes app distribution services, Epic has been harmed by Defendants’ anti-
competitive conduct in a manner that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.  Epic 
has suffered and continues to suffer damages and irreparable injury, and such damages 
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and injury will not abate until an injunction ending Google’s anti-competitive conduct 
issues.  
COUNT 3:  Sherman Act § 1  
(Unreasonable restraints of trade concerning  
Android App Distribution Market:  DDA) 
(against all Defendants except Google Payment) 
150. Epic restates, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
151. Defendants’ conduct violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”.   
15 U.S.C. § 1.  
152. Google forces app developers to enter its standardized DDA, 
including Developer Program Policies integrated into that Agreement, as a condition of 
being distributed through Google’s app store, the Google Play Store.  The relevant 
provisions of these agreements unreasonably restrain competition in the Android App 
Distribution Market.   
153. Section 4.5 of the DDA provides that developers “may not use 
Google Play to distribute or make available any Product that has a purpose that 
facilitates the distribution of software applications and games for use on Android 
devices outside of Google Play”.  Section 4.1 of the DDA requires that all developers 
“adhere” to Google’s Developer Program Policies.  Under the guise of its so-called 
“Malicious Behavior” Policy, Google prohibits developers from distributing apps that 
“download executable code [i.e., code that would execute an app] from a source other 
than Google Play”.  The DDA further reserves to Google the right to remove and 
disable any Android app that it determines violates either the DDA or its Developer 
Program Policies and to terminate the DDA on these bases.  (§§ 8.3, 10.3.)  These 
provisions prevent app developers from offering competing app stores through the 
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Google Play Store, even though there is no legitimate technological or other impediment 
to distributing a competing app store through the Google Play Store. 
154. These agreements serve no legitimate or pro-competitive purpose 
that could justify their anti-competitive effects, and thus unreasonably restrain 
competition in the Android App Distribution Market.   
155. Google’s conduct affects a substantial volume of interstate as well as 
foreign commerce. 
156. Google’s conduct has substantial anti-competitive effects, including 
increased prices and costs, reduced innovation and quality of service, and lowered 
output. 
157. As a potential competing app distributor and as an app developer that 
consumes app distribution services, Epic has been harmed by Defendants’ anti-
competitive conduct in a manner that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.  Epic 
has suffered and continues to suffer damages and irreparable injury, and such damages 
and injury will not abate until an injunction ending Google’s anti-competitive conduct 
issues.  
COUNT 4:  Sherman Act § 2 
(Unlawful Monopolization and Monopoly Maintenance in the  
Android In-App Payment Processing Market) 
(against all Defendants) 
158. Epic restates, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
159. Google’s conduct violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits the “monopoliz[ation of] any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations”.  15 U.S.C. § 2.  
160. The Android In-App Payment Processing Market is a valid antitrust 
market.  In the alternative, the Android Games Payment Processing Market is a valid 
antitrust market.   
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161. Google holds monopoly power in the Android In-App Payment 
Processing Market and, in the alternative, in the Android Games Payment Processing 
Market.   
162. Google has unlawfully acquired monopoly power in these Markets, 
including through the anti-competitive acts described herein.  And however Google 
initially acquired its monopoly, it has unlawfully maintained its monopoly, including 
through the anti-competitive acts described herein. 
163. Google’s conduct affects a substantial volume of interstate as well as 
foreign commerce. 
164. Google’s conduct has substantial anti-competitive effects, including 
increased prices and costs, reduced innovation and quality of service, and lowered 
output. 
165. As an app developer and as the developer of a competing in-app 
payment processing tool, Epic has been harmed by Defendants’ anti-competitive 
conduct in a manner that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.  Epic has suffered 
and continues to suffer damages and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury 
will not abate until an injunction ending Google’s anti-competitive conduct issues.  
COUNT 5:  Sherman Act § 1   
(Unreasonable restraints of trade concerning  
Android In-App Payment Processing Market) 
(against all Defendants) 
166. Epic restates, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
167. Defendants’ conduct violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”.  
15 U.S.C. § 1.  
168. Google, except Google Payment, forces app developers to enter its 
standardized DDA, including Developer Program Policies integrated into that 
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Agreement, as a condition of having their apps distributed through Google’s 
monopolized app store, Google Play Store.  The relevant provisions of these agreements 
unreasonably restrain competition in the Android In-App Payment Processing Market. 
169. Section 3.2 of the DDA requires that Android app developers enter 
into a separate agreement with Google’s payment processor, Defendant Google 
Payment, in order to receive payment for apps and content distributed through the 
Google Play Store.  This includes payments related to in-app purchases of digital 
content.  Further, Google’s Developer Program Policies, compliance with which Section 
4.1 of the DDA makes obligatory, require that apps distributed through the Google Play 
Store “must use Google Play In-app Billing [offered by Google Payment] as the method 
of payment” for such in-app purchases.  While Google’s Policies exclude certain types 
of transactions from this requirement, such as the purchase of “solely physical products” 
or of “digital content that may be consumed outside of the app itself”, Google expressly 
applies its anti-competitive mandate to every “game downloaded on Google Play” and 
to all purchased “game content”, such as purchases made within Fortnite. 
170. The challenged provisions serve no sufficient legitimate or pro-
competitive purpose and unreasonably restrain competition in the Android In-App 
Payment Processing Market and, in the alternative, the Android Games Payment 
Processing Market.   
171. Defendants’ conduct affects a substantial volume of interstate as well 
as foreign commerce. 
172. Defendants’ conduct has substantial anti-competitive effects, 
including increased prices and costs, reduced innovation and quality of service, and 
lowered output. 
173. As an app developer and as the developer of a competing in-app 
payment processing tool, Epic has been harmed by Defendants’ anti-competitive 
conduct in a manner that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.  Epic has suffered 
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and continues to suffer damages and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury 
will not abate until an injunction ending Google’s anti-competitive conduct issues.  
COUNT 6:  Sherman Act § 1  
(Tying Google Play Store to Google Play Billing) 
(against all Defendants) 
174. Epic restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
175. Defendants’ conduct violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”   
15 U.S.C. § 1. 
176. Google has unlawfully tied the Google Play Store to its in-app 
payment processor, Google Play Billing, through its DDAs with app developers and its 
Developer Program Policies.  
177. Google has sufficient economic power in the tying market, the 
Android App Distribution Market.  With Google Play Store installed on nearly all 
Android OS devices and over 90% of downloads on Android OS devices being 
performed by the Google Play Store, Google has overwhelming market power.  
Google’s market power is further evidenced by its ability to extract supra-competitive 
taxes on the sale of apps through the Google Play Store. 
178. The availability of the Google Play Store for app distribution is 
conditioned on the app developer accepting a second product, Google’s in-app payment 
processing services.  Google’s foreclosure of alternative app distribution channels forces 
developers like Epic to use Google’s in-app payment processing services, which Google 
has expressly made a condition of reaching Android users through its dominant Google 
Play Store. 
179. The tying product, Android app distribution, is distinct from the tied 
product, Android in-app payment processing, because app developers such as Epic have 
alternative in-app payment processing options and would prefer to choose among them 
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independently of how an Android app is distributed.  Google’s unlawful tying 
arrangement thus ties two separate products that are in separate markets. 
180. Google’s conduct forecloses competition in the Android In-App 
Payment Processing Market, and, in the alternative, in the Android Games Payment 
Processing Market, affecting a substantial volume of commerce in these Markets.  
181. Google has thus engaged in a per se illegal tying arrangement and 
the Court does not need to engage in a detailed assessment of the anti-competitive 
effects of Google’s conduct or its purported justifications. 
182. In the alternative only, even if Google’s conduct does not constitute 
a per se illegal tie, a detailed analysis of Google’s tying arrangement would demonstrate 
that this arrangement violates the rule of reason and is illegal. 
183. As an app developer which consumes in-app payment processing 
services and as the developer of a competing in-app payment processing tool, Epic has 
been harmed by Defendants’ anti-competitive conduct in a manner that the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent.  Epic has suffered and continues to suffer damages and 
irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction ending 
Google’s anti-competitive conduct issues.  
COUNT 7:  California Cartwright Act 
(Unreasonable restraints of trade in Android App Distribution Market) 
(against all Defendants except Google Payment) 
184. Epic restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
185. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Cartwright 
Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, the combination 
of resources by two or more persons to restrain trade or commerce or to prevent market 
competition.  See §§ 16720, 16726.  
186. Under the Cartwright Act, a “combination” is formed when the anti-
competitive conduct of a single firm coerces other market participants to involuntarily 
adhere to the anti-competitive scheme.   
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187. The Android App Distribution Market is a valid antitrust market.  
188. Google has executed agreements with OEMs that unreasonably 
restrict competition in the Android App Distribution Market.  Namely, Google has 
entered into MADAs with OEMs that require OEMs to offer the Google Play Store as 
the primary—and practically the only—app store on Android mobile devices.  These 
agreements further prevent OEMs from offering alternative app stores on Android 
mobile devices in any prominent visual positioning.   
189. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anti-competitive 
effects, including increased prices and costs, reduced innovation, poorer quality of 
customer service and lowered output.  
190. Google’s conduct harms Epic which, as a direct result of Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct, has been unreasonably restricted in its ability to distribute its 
Android applications, including Fortnite, and to market a competing app store to the 
Google Play Store.  
191. It is appropriate to bring this action under the Cartwright Act 
because many of the illegal agreements were made in California and purport to be 
governed by California law, many affected consumers reside in California, Google has 
its principal place of business in California and overt acts in furtherance of Google’s 
anti-competitive scheme took place in California. 
192. Epic has suffered and continues to suffer damages and irreparable 
injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction ending Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct issues. 
COUNT 8:  California Cartwright Act 
(Unreasonable restraints of trade in Android App Distribution Market) 
(against all Defendants except Google Payment) 
193. Epic restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
194. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Cartwright 
Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq., which prohibits, inter alia,  the 
Case 3:20-cv-05671   Document 1   Filed 08/13/20   Page 54 of 63
 
 






























combination of resources by two or more persons to restrain trade or commerce or to 
prevent market competition.  See §§ 16720, 16726.  
195. Under the Cartwright Act, a “combination” is formed when the anti-
competitive conduct of a single firm coerces other market participants to involuntarily 
adhere to the anti-competitive scheme.   
196. The Android App Distribution Market is a valid antitrust market.  
197. Google conditions distribution through the Google Play Store on 
entering into the standardized DDA described above, including the Developer Program 
Policies integrated therein.  Through certain provisions in these agreements, Google 
forces app developers to submit to conditions that unreasonably restrain competition in 
the Android App Distribution Market.  
198. Section 4.5 of the DDA provides that developers “may not use 
Google Play to distribute or make available any Product that has a purpose that 
facilitates the distribution of software applications and games for use on Android 
devices outside of Google Play.”  Section 4.1 of the DDA requires that all developers 
“adhere” to Google’s Developer Program Policies.  Under the guise of its so-called 
“Malicious Behavior” Policy, Google prohibits developers from distributing apps that 
“download executable code [i.e., code that would execute an app] from a source other 
than Google Play.”  The DDA further reserves to Google the right to remove and 
disable any Android app that it determines violates either the DDA or its Developer 
Program Policies and to terminate the DDA on these bases.  (§§ 8.3, 10.3.)  These 
provisions prevent app developers from offering competing app stores through the 
Google Play Store, even though there is no legitimate technological or other impediment 
to distributing a competing app store through the Google Play Store.  
199. These provisions have no legitimate or pro-competitive purpose or 
effect, and unreasonably restrain competition in the Android App Distribution Market.  
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200. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anti-competitive 
effects, including increased prices and costs, reduced innovation, poorer quality of 
customer service, and lowered output.  
201. Google’s conduct harms Epic which, as a direct result of Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct, has been unreasonably restricted in its ability to distribute its 
Android applications, including Fortnite, and to market a competing app store to the 
Google Play Store.  
202. It is appropriate to bring this action under the Cartwright Act 
because many of the illegal agreements were made in California and purport to be 
governed by California law, many affected consumers reside in California, Google has 
its principal place of business in California, and overt acts in furtherance of Google’s 
anti-competitive scheme took place in California. 
203. Epic has suffered and continues to suffer damages and irreparable 
injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction ending Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct issues.  
COUNT 9:  California Cartwright Act 
(Unreasonable restraints of trade in Android In-App Payment Processing Market) 
(against all Defendants) 
204. Epic restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
205. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Cartwright 
Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq., which prohibits, inter alia,  the 
combination of resources by two or more persons to restrain trade or commerce or to 
prevent market competition.  See §§ 16720, 16726.  
206. Under the Cartwright Act, a “combination” is formed when the anti-
competitive conduct of a single firm coerces other market participants to involuntarily 
adhere to the anti-competitive scheme. 
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207. The Android App Distribution Market and Android In-App Payment 
Processing Market, and, in the alternative, the Android Games Payment Processing 
Market, are valid antitrust markets.  
208. Google has monopoly power in the Android In-App Payment 
Processing Market and, in the alternative, in the Android Games Payment Processing 
Market.   
209. Google conditions distribution through the Google Play Store on 
entering into the standardized DDA described above, including the Developer Program 
Policies integrated therein.  Through certain provisions in these agreements, Google 
forces app developers to submit to conditions that unreasonably restrain competition in 
the Android In-App Payment Processing Market.  
210. Section 3.2 of the DDA requires that Android app developers enter 
into a separate agreement with Google’s payment processor, Defendant Google 
Payment, in order to receive payment for apps and content distributed through the 
Google Play Store.  This includes payments related to in-app purchases.  Further, 
Google’s Developer Program Policies, compliance with which Section 4.1 of the DDA 
makes obligatory, require that apps distributed through the Google Play Store “must use 
Google Play In-app Billing [offered by Google Payment] as the method of payment” for 
in-app purchases.  While Google’s Policies exclude certain types of transactions from 
this requirement, such as the purchase of “solely physical products” or of “digital 
content that may be consumed outside of the app itself”, Google expressly and 
discriminatorily applies its anti-competitive mandate to every “game downloaded on 
Google Play” and to all purchased “game content”, such as purchases made within 
Fortnite. 
211. These provisions have no legitimate or pro-competitive purpose or 
effect, and unreasonably restrain competition in the Android In-App Payment 
Processing Market, and, in the alternative, in the Android Games Payment Processing 
Market.  
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212. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anti-competitive 
effects, including increased prices and costs, reduced innovation, poorer quality of 
customer service and lowered output.  
213. Google’s conduct harms Epic which, as a direct result of Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct, has been unreasonably restricted in its ability to distribute and 
use its own in-app payment processor. 
214. It is appropriate to bring this action under the Cartwright Act 
because many of the illegal agreements were made in California and purport to be 
governed by California law, many affected consumers reside in California, Google has 
its principal place of business in California and overt acts in furtherance of Google’s 
anti-competitive scheme took place in California.  
215. Epic has suffered and continues to suffer damages and irreparable 
injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction ending Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct issues.  
COUNT 10:  California Cartwright Act 
(Tying Google Play Store to Google Play Billing) 
(against all Defendants) 
216. Epic restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
217. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Cartwright 
Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq., which prohibits, inter alia,  the 
combination of resources by two or more persons to restrain trade or commerce, or to 
prevent market competition.  See §§ 16720, 16726.  
218. Under the Cartwright Act, a “combination” is formed when the anti-
competitive conduct of a single firm coerces other market participants to involuntarily 
adhere to the anti-competitive scheme.   
219. The Cartwright Act also makes it “unlawful for any person to lease 
or make a sale or contract for the sale of goods, merchandise, machinery, supplies, 
commodities for use within the State, or to fix a price charged therefor, or discount 
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from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement or understanding that the 
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, merchandise, machinery, 
supplies, commodities, or services of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, 
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or 
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly 
in any line of trade or commerce in any section of the State.”  § 16727. 
220. As detailed above, Google has unlawfully tied its in-app payment 
processor, Google Play Billing, to the Google Play Store through its DDAs with app 
developers and its Developer Program Policies.   
221. Google has sufficient economic power in the tying market, the 
Android App Distribution Market, to affect competition in the tied market, the Android 
In-App Payment Distribution Market.  With Google Play Store installed on nearly all 
Android OS devices and over 90% of downloads on Android OS devices being 
performed by the Google Play Store, Google has overwhelming market power.  
Google’s market power is further evidenced by its ability to extract supra-competitive 
taxes on the sale of apps through the Google Play Store. 
222. The availability of the Google Play Store for app distribution is 
conditioned on the app developer accepting a second product, Google’s in-app payment 
processing services.  Google’s foreclosure of alternative app distribution channels forces 
developers like Epic to use Google’s in-app payment processing services, which Google 
has expressly made a condition of reaching Android users through its dominant Google 
Play Store. 
223. The tying product, Android app distribution, is separate and distinct 
from the tied product, Android in-app payment processing, because app developers such 
as Epic have alternative in-app payment processing options and would prefer to choose 
among them independently of how an Android app is distributed.  Google’s unlawful 
tying arrangement thus ties two separate products that are in separate markets.   
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224. Google’s conduct forecloses competition in the Android In-App 
Payment Processing Market and, in the alternative, in the Android Games Payment 
Processing Market, affecting a substantial volume of commerce in these Markets.  
225. Google has thus engaged in a per se illegal tying arrangement and 
the Court does not need to engage in a detailed assessment of the anti-competitive 
effects of Google’s conduct or its purported justifications. 
226. Even if Google’s conduct does not form a per se illegal tie, an 
assessment of the tying arrangement would demonstrate that it is unreasonable under the 
Cartwright Act, and therefore, illegal. 
227. Google’s acts and practices detailed above unreasonably restrain 
competition in the Android In-App Payment Processing Market and, in the alternative, 
in the Android Games Payment Processing Market. 
228. Google’s conduct harms Epic which, as a direct result of Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct, is paying a supra-competitive commission rate on in-app 
purchases processed through Google’s payment processor and has forgone commission 
revenue it would be able to generate if its own in-app payment processor were not 
unreasonably restricted from the market.  
229. As an app developer which consumes in-app payment processing 
services and as the developer of a competing in-app payment processing tool, Epic has 
been harmed by Defendants’ anti-competitive conduct in a manner that the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent.   
230. It is appropriate to bring this action under the Cartwright Act 
because many of the illegal agreements were made in California and purport to be 
governed by California law, many affected consumers reside in California, Google has 
its principal place of business in California, and overt acts in furtherance of Google’s 
anti-competitive scheme took place in California.  
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231. Epic has suffered and continues to suffer damages and irreparable 
injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction ending Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct issues.  
COUNT 11:  California Unfair Competition Law 
(against all Defendants) 
232. Epic restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the 
allegations set forth in the rest of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
233. Google’s conduct, as described above, violates California’s Unfair 
Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., which prohibits any 
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. 
234. Epic has standing to bring this claim because it has suffered injury in 
fact and lost money as a result of Google’s unfair competition.  Specifically, it develops 
and distributes apps for the Android mobile platform, and has developed and distributes 
a processor for in-app purchases, and Google’s conduct has unreasonably restricted 
Epic’s ability to fairly compete in the relevant markets with these products.   
235. Google’s conduct violates the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act, 
and thus constitutes unlawful conduct under § 17200.   
236. Google’s conduct is also “unfair” within the meaning of the Unfair 
Competition Law.   
237. Google’s conduct harms Epic which, as a direct result of Google’s 
anti-competitive conduct, is unreasonably prevented from freely distributing mobile 
apps or its in-app payment processing tool, and forfeits a higher commission rate on the 
in-app purchases than it would pay absent Google’s conduct. 
238. Epic seeks injunctive relief under the Unfair Competition Law.  
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in 
favor of Epic and against Defendants: 
A. Issuing an injunction prohibiting Google’s anti-competitive and unfair 
conduct and mandating that Google take all necessary steps to cease such 
conduct and to restore competition;   
B. Awarding a declaration that the contractual restraints complained of herein 
are unlawful and unenforceable;   
C. Awarding any other equitable relief necessary to prevent and remedy 
Google’s anti-competitive conduct; and 
D. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.  
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